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Current Issues
Would there be added value resulting from the creation of legally
binding international arrangements for the Arctic? |
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Most of the recent initiatives involving
international cooperation in the Circumpolar North have taken the
form of soft law in contrast to hard law. Even in the case of the
Arctic Council, a regionwide arrangement featuring interstate relations,
cooperation rests on a ministerial declaration that does not require
ratification on the part of the member states. Is this a defect
to be remedied as quickly and effectively as possible? [17]
Advocates of a move to legally binding commitments point to the
fact that member states are likely to feel less committed to nonbinding
agreements and that they may find it more difficult to secure resources
to implement the terms of nonbinding agreements in the competition
for material resources unfolding in domestic policy arenas. On the
other hand, soft law agreements are not without merits of their
own. It is easier to induce actors to enter into substantively significant
agreements that are not legally binding. Soft law regimes allow
more flexibility in introducing innovative arrangements such as
the provisions dealing with Permanent Participants in the case of
the Arctic Council. And these relatively informal regimes are easier
to adjust in a timely manner to changing circumstances giving rise
to a need for institutional adjustments in a dynamic region like
the Arctic. Once again, therefore, we are faced with a balancing
act. It is not that making international commitments legally binding
offers no value added in a variety of settings. But the fact is
that the current practice of advancing the cause of international
cooperation in the Arctic through nonbinding agreements has a number
of advantages that most of the players rightly regard as attractive. |
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